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DEMOLISHING FARM IMPROVEMENTS
— by Neil E. Harl*
Farm consolidation and shifts in livestock production
patterns have generated intense interest in the demolition of
buildings on farms and ranches.1 The income tax treatment
of — (1) any remaining basis in the property and (2) the
costs of demolition,influence the timing of the decision to
demolish and whether unused buildings and other
improvements should be left standing.
Demolition before 1984
Prior to enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984,2 if a building or other improvement was acquired
with an intent to demolish, it was not possible to deduct a
depreciation allowance for any income tax basis in the
property.3 If the intent to demolish was formed after
acquisition and allocation of a basis amount to assets, a
deduction could be claimed for the remaining basis at the
time of demolition.4 The litigated cases tended to focus on
when the intent to demolish a structure was formulated.5
Demolition after 1983
After December 31, 1983,6 no deduction has been
allowed for losses "on account of" demolition with respect
to a structure or for any expenses incurred in the
demolition.7 Those amounts are to be capitalized and added
to the income tax basis of the land on which the structure
was located.8
Repeal of the land clearing expense deduction in 1986
effective at the end of 19859 removed also the possibility of
a deduction for removal of trees, stumps and brush and for
other expenses associated with the clearing of land to make
it suitable for use in farming.10
In 1990, IRS pointed out that the 1984 enactment
prohibiting a deduction on demolition did not apply to
"amounts expended for the demolition of a structure
damaged or destroyed by casualty, and to any loss sustained
on account of such a demolition."11 The IRS noted that if a
casualty damages or destroys a structure, and the structure
is then demolished, the income tax basis of the structure
must be reduced by the deductible casualty loss12 before the
"loss sustained on account of" the demolition is
determined.13 Thus, if a building were to be destroyed by an
earthquake, the basis in the building would be deductible as
a  c a s u a l t y
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loss but the cost of cleaning up the rubble would have to be
added to the basis of the land.14
DeCou v. Commissioner
A 1994 Tax Court case, DeCou v. Commissioner,15
allowed an "abnormal retirement loss" where a building had
suffered a reduction in value before demolition took place.
In that case, a government inspector had noted deterioration
of the building in question, defects in the floor, water leaks
in the roof and shorts in the electrical system.16 Later, the
building was demolished.
The owner of the building claimed the remaining basis
in the building ($85,987) as  "an ordinary abandonment or
retirement loss deduction" but added the cost of demolition
($17,655) to the basis in the land.17 IRS disagreed, arguing
that the taxpayer was not entitled to a loss deduction
because it was not the result of a casualty or extraordinary
obsolescence. The Service position was that the remaining
basis in the building should be considered as a
nondeductible cost of demolishing the building.18
The Tax Court agreed with the taxpayer and allowed a
deduction for an "abnormal retirement loss."19 The court
noted that IRS had implied, in Notice 90-21,20 that a loss
sustained before a building's demolition would not be
treated as sustained "on account of" the demolition.
Therefore, such losses would not be disallowed by I.R.C. §
280B. As the court explained, "the withdrawal of
the...building constituted an abnormal retirement that was
caused by the unexpected and extraordinary obsolescence of
the building."21 The court found that the building's fair
market value and salvage value were both zero on the date
of demolition; therefore, the entire remaining basis was an
allowable deduction.
In conclusion
Although the amounts actually expended for demolition
are usually non deductible and must be added to the basis of
the land, two possibilities exist for claiming a partial or total
deduction for any remaining basis in the property
demolished. First, a casualty loss may be claimable if, in
fact, a casualty has damaged or destroyed the property.22
Second, an abnormal retirement loss deduction may be
available if the improvement had suffered a reduction in
value prior to the demolition.23
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE. The debtor's corporation had purchased
real property from the creditor and had given a note
personally guaranteed by the debtor for a portion of the
purchase price. The note required written consent from the
creditor before the property could be sold. The debtor's
corporation sold the property to a partnership when the
debtor sought modification of the note terms. The creditor
sought a ruling that the note was nondischargeable under
Section 523(a)(2)(A) because the debtor had committed
fraud in failing to reveal the conveyance or seek prior
consent for the transfer. The court ruled that the standard of
justifiable reliance by the creditor applied to Section
523(a)(2)(A), instead of reasonable reliance as required by
Section 523(A)(2)(B). Field v. Mans, __ S. Ct. __ (1995),
rev'g, 36 F.3d 1089 (1st Cir. 1994).
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The debtor
was a member of several limited liability companies (LLC),
all of which had incorporated the Nebraska limited liability
company law into their Articles of Organization such that
the bankruptcy of a member dissolved the company unless
two-thirds of the other members vote to continue the LLC.
After the debtor's Chapter 11 filing, the members of the
LLCs voted to continue the LLCs but without the debtor.
The court held that the state law dissolution provision was
unenforceable against a member in bankruptcy and that the
actions of the other members in continuing to operate the
LLCs without the debtor violated the automatic stay. The
court held that the LLC Articles of Organization and
Operating Agreements were executory contracts which the
debtor could assume or reject in bankruptcy. The court also
refused to order sanctions for the violations of the automatic
stay because the other members were acting in good faith
under the state law. Matter of Daughtery Const., Inc., 188
B.R. 607 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995).
PRIORITY. The debtor was a walnut handler subject to
assessments by the California Walnut Commission for
promotional and marketing programs. The Commission
filed a claim for unpaid assessments and sought priority
status for the claim as a tax claim. The assessments were
used to promote and advertise the sale of walnuts, to
conduct marketing research and to publish information for
walnut producers and handlers. The court held that the
claim was not entitled to priority status as a tax because the
assessments primarily benefited private walnut producers
and not the general public. In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 188 B.R.
392 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
    CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
PLAN. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the debtors had
granted to a creditor a security interest in the debtors' rural
residence and farm equipment. The security interests were
subordinated by agreement of the creditor to a security
interest held by another creditor.  On the petition date, the
value of the farm equipment was less than the secured claim
of the first security interest holder and the value of the real
property was insufficient to fully secure the claim of the
creditor with the second security interest. That creditor
argued that, under Section 1322(b)(2), its secured claim
could not be modified by the plan because it was secured
only by the debtors' residence at the time of the petition.
The court held that, in determining whether Section
1322(b)(2) applied, the rights of the creditor under state law
determined whether the creditor's claim was secured solely
by the debtors' residence. The court held that, because the
security interest covered the residence and farm equipment,
the creditor's claim was not secured solely by the residence
and could be modified by the Chapter 13 plan. In re
Barrett, 188 B.R. 285 (Bankr. D. Or. 1995).
TRUSTEE'S FEES. The debtors were farmers with
nonfarm income. The debtors' Chapter 13 plan provided for
direct payments to the IRS and payment of all unmodified
claims. The plan also provided payment on an impaired
claim filed by the FmHA. The debtors' plan projected
income of $34,854 and annual expenses of $16,613.67. The
direct payments left only $569.00 for payments to
unsecured creditors and trustee's fees. Therefore, if the
trustee's fee had to be paid on any of the direct payments,
the plan could not be confirmed because there was
insufficient income. The court held that, as in Chapter 12
